



Household Balance Sheets and 
the Recovery
Timothy Bianco and Filippo Occhino
Falling home and ﬁ  nancial asset prices have combined to weaken the average household’s balance sheet, and this has 
helped to slow down the current recovery. We examine the role that household balance sheets have typically played in 
postwar business cycles and assess their importance in explaining why some recoveries, including the current one, have 
been weaker than others. 
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Figure 1. Real GDP Gap
Source: Authors’ calculations from Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
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The slow pace of the current recovery has been a source 
of concern for some time. Whereas real GDP growth after 
severe recessions has generally been very strong, that has not 
been the case during the current recovery, which followed 
the worst postwar recession. This time around, it took three 
years for real GDP to return to where it was just before the 
start of the recession.
One factor behind the slow recovery has been the weak-
ness of household balance sheets. During the ﬁ  nancial crisis, 
the values of real estate assets and ﬁ  nancial assets plunged, 
lowering household net worth and raising leverage. To 
repair their balance sheets, households have been increasing 
their saving rate, raising the average from its pre-recession 
level of around 2 percent to its current level above 5 percent. 
This deleveraging process has slowed consumption and, as a 
result, the recovery.
We examine the role that household balance sheets have 
played in postwar business cycles and assess their importance 
in explaining why some recoveries, including the current one, 
have been weaker than others. We begin by documenting 
some important differences across past business cycles. We 
then study the role played by household balance sheets using 
a simple, conventional model of the U.S. economy. We high-
light both the direct impact of balance sheets on economic 
activity and the indirect mechanism through which balance 
sheets amplify and propagate the effects of macroeconomic 
shocks. We ﬁ  nd that balance sheets have contributed impor-
tantly to the dynamics of some business cycles, especially the 
more recent ones.
Weaker and Longer Recoveries
Past business cycles have not followed a unique pattern. 
In particular, there have been important differences in the 
recoveries. Some recoveries, especially those right after 
World War II, were strong and rapid. Others, especially 
the more recent ones, have been weaker and longer.
To compare the different business cycle patterns, we decom-
pose real GDP into the sum of the GDP trend and the GDP 
gap.1 The trend is determined by long-run factors such as 
structural productivity, capital accumulation, and long-run 
growth in the labor force, while the gap is the cyclical compo-
nent that reﬂ  ects short-run factors. Since we are interested in 
business cycle properties, we take the trend as given and base 
our analysis on the gap.
In the earlier postwar cycles (1948–1960), recoveries were 
short, rapid, and strong (ﬁ  gure 1). Real GDP rebounded right 
after the trough of the recession, growing faster than the trend 
growth rate and rapidly catching up to the trend. The path 
of the GDP gap was roughly symmetrical around the trough 
of the recession and looked V-shaped: It ﬁ  rst decreased and 
then rapidly returned to zero, with the recovery phase lasting 
approximately as long as the recession phase. The two cycles 
in the 1980s looked V-shaped as well.
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Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.









1948:Q4 4 3 1.8834
1953:Q2 4 4  2.4459
1957:Q3 3 4  2.2864
1960:Q2 3  3  2.0014
1969:Q4 4 9   4.9845
1973:Q4 5 13 7.3573
1980:Q1 2 2 1.4951
1981:Q3 5 11 4.0108
1990:Q3 2 32 30.7787
2001:Q1 3 12 10.1975
2007:Q4  6>  6 ?
Source: NBER; authors’ calculations.
Figure 3. Household Leverage
Notes: Leverage is deﬁ  ned as the ratio of assets to net worth. Leverage has been 
logged and detrended. The trend has been computed using the HP ﬁ  lter. Shaded 
bars indicate recessions.
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds; NBER.
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Recoveries were weaker during the 1970s (1969 and 1973 
cycles) and they lasted longer—that is, GDP took longer 
to return to trend. The path of the GDP gap looked more 
like a check mark than a V, with the recovery phase lasting 
longer than the recession phase. The longest and weakest 
recoveries have been the three most recent ones (1990, 
2001, and 2007 cycles). There has been no strong GDP 
rebound or growth, and the recovery phase has lasted 
years. We might say the path of the GDP gap was some-
what L-shaped, though perhaps it is more accurate to say 
it was erratic and shapeless.
Another way to see differences in business cycle patterns is 
by comparing the lengths of recessions with their respective 
recoveries. Table 1 lists the NBER-measured lengths of all 
postwar recessions along with two alternative measures for 
the length of the subsequent recoveries. The ﬁ  rst measure 
is the number of quarters that it took for GDP to return 
to its trend. The second, which we label the duration of the 
recovery, is a more sophisticated measure that takes into 
account whether most of the GDP gap was closed earlier 
or later during the recovery phase.2
For all the V-shaped business cycles, especially the ﬁ  rst 
four in our sample, the length of the recovery tended not 
to exceed the length of the preceding recession. In contrast, 
the recovery lasts longer than the recession in the other 
business cycles, especially those after 1990.
Not only has the pattern of GDP over the cycle tended 
to change over time, so has the pattern of unemployment. 
During the earlier cycles, unemployment peaked approxi-
mately at the trough of the recession and then rapidly 
decreased (ﬁ  gure 2). Since the 1970s, unemployment has 
peaked later and later and has decreased more slowly.
The Role of Household Balance Sheets
Household balance sheets have been one factor behind 
these business cycle differences. Balance sheets have been 
weaker in the slower recoveries.
To measure the weakness of balance sheets, we use leverage, 
deﬁ  ned as the ratio of assets to net worth. High leverage 
indicates weak balance sheets. Leverage in the household 
sector was especially high relative to trend during the 1973, 
2001, and 2007 cycles, whose recoveries were especially 
slow (see ﬁ  gure 3). During all of these three business cycles, 
ﬁ  nancial asset prices experienced sizeable drops. In addi-
tion, house prices plunged during the last cycle. As asset 
prices fell, the value of households’ assets decreased, raising 
households’ leverage and weakening their balance sheets (a 
decrease in asset values causes a larger percentage drop in 
net worth, raising leverage).
When their leverage is high, households increase their 
savings because they want to repair their balance sheets. 
This switch to saving tends to decrease consumption and 
to slow down the recovery. In fact, data show that leverage 
relative to trend is negatively correlated with present and 
2011-05.indd   4 3/30/2011   2:05:40 PMFigure 5. Response of the Unemployment Rate to 
Two Contractionary Shocks
Note: This ﬁ  gure plots the impulse response functions of unemployment to macro-
economic and balance sheet shocks. The impulse response function tracks the aver-
age response over time to a shock occurring in period zero. It is the deviation in the 
path that a variable follows over time due to the occurrence of the shock. The size 
of the shock is equal to its average size in the time period considered (one standard 
deviation). The response to an unemployment shock is statistically signiﬁ  cant at a 5 
percent level for ﬁ  ve quarters, while the response to a balance sheet shock is statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant for two and a half years.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 4. Response of Real GDP to 
Two Contractionary Shocks
Note: This ﬁ  gure plots the impulse response functions of real GDP to macroeconomic 
and balance sheet shocks. The impulse response function tracks the average re-
sponse over time to a shock occurring in period zero. It is the deviation in the path that 
a variable follows over time due to the occurrence of the shock. The size of the shock 
is equal to its average size in the time period considered (one standard deviation). 























future production, so high leverage tends to be associated 
with and followed by a decrease in real activity. This type 
of evidence is not sufﬁ  cient by itself to identify the role 
played by household balance sheets in business cycles, 
however. It can show that high leverage is associated 
with low economic activity, but it cannot discern whether 
leverage actively causes changes in economic activity or 
whether it passively responds to economic activity.
To formally assess the relationship between balance sheets 
and the business cycle, we use a common, simple model 
of the aggregate economy. The variables included are 
production, the unemployment rate, inﬂ  ation, the short-
term risk-free interest rate, an oil-price index, and house-
hold leverage. The model, a vector auto-regression (VAR), 
relates each variable to the past values of all variables in 
the model and to various types of shocks.3 This type of 
model has been shown to effectively capture the dynamics 
of the business cycle—we use it to determine how changes 
in balance sheets affect economic activity and how balance 
sheets respond to changes in the economy.
First, we look at the economic effects of a shock to balance 
sheets, that is, an unanticipated increase in leverage. For 
instance, an adverse balance sheet shock could be the result 
of an unexpected drop in the price of real estate or ﬁ  nancial 
assets. Our model suggests that the response of the econo-
my to such a shock is the one we would expect based on 
intuition: After an unanticipated increase in leverage, real 
GDP decreases and unemployment increases (ﬁ  gures 4 and 
5). So adverse balance sheet shocks discourage economic 
activity. Moreover, the responses of real GDP and unem-
ployment are delayed and persistent, with the peak of the 
responses not occurring until approximately a year or more 
after the shock hits. In contrast, the responses of real GDP 
and unemployment to shocks that affect them directly are 
more immediate: The peaks of the responses occur after only 
one and two quarters, respectively. This suggests that balance 
sheet shocks cause important changes in economic activity 
and that their effect is more delayed than that of other shocks.
We also use the VAR to evaluate the relative contribution of 
balance sheet shocks and other shocks to business cycles. For 
each business cycle, we took the path that was expected for 
GDP at the beginning of the cycle, looked at the deviation 
from the path over the cycle, and decomposed the devia-
tion into the part due to balance sheet shocks and the part 
due to all other shocks. This decomposition reveals that 
adverse balance sheet shocks played an important role in 
three cycles—1973, 1990, and especially 2007, the most recent 
one (ﬁ  gure 6). Balance sheet shocks caused real GDP to be 
below its expected path by 3.8 percentage points in the fourth 
quarter of 2009, accounting for 84 percent of the total drop. 
They were important during the recovery phase of the 2001 
cycle as well. The decomposition for unemployment leads to 
2011-05.indd   5 3/30/2011   2:05:41 PMFigure 6. Contribution of Balance Sheet Shocks to Business Cycles
Notes: For each business cycle episode, we plot the deviation of real GDP from its path expected at the beginning of the cycle (solid line). This deviation 
is due to all types of shocks hitting the economy (including balance sheet shocks). The shaded area shows the portion of the deviation of real GDP from 
its expected path that is due to balance sheet shocks only.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 7. Response of Leverage to a Contractionary GDP 
Shock before and after 1985
Notes: Response to a one-standard-deviation shock. The response of leverage is not 
statistically signiﬁ  cant at a 5 percent level before 1985, whereas it is statistically 
signiﬁ  cant for two quarters in the period after 1985.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
very similar conclusions. Since balance sheet shocks tend to 
have a more delayed effect on economic activity relative to 
other shocks, this explains in part why the later recoveries 
have been slower.
Our results so far have highlighted the importance of the 
direct impact of balance sheet shocks on economic activity. 
However, balance sheets play another important role: They 
amplify and propagate the effects of macroeconomic shocks. 
After an adverse macroeconomic shock, an increase in lever-
age reinforces the direct contractionary effect of the shock.
To study whether this indirect mechanism can explain part 
of the differences in business cycle patterns, we consider 
separately the two periods before and after 1985, estimating 
the VAR model separately for the two periods (ﬁ  gure 7). 
This reveals that the response of leverage to macroeconomic 
shocks has changed over time. In response to a contraction-
ary shock to GDP, such as an adverse productivity shock, 
leverage tended to decrease before 1985, thereby attenuating 
the effects of the shock, while it has tended to increase after 
1985, thereby amplifying and propagating the effects of the 
shock. As a result of this change, balance sheets have dete-
riorated more in response to contractionary macroeconomic 
shocks after 1985, and this development is likely to have 
contributed to slowing down the later recoveries.
Conclusion
By using fairly conventional methods and assumptions, we 
have unveiled some general patterns. We have found that 
weak household balance sheets have been an important 
factor behind the slower recoveries, especially the current 
one. One reason is that balance sheet shocks, which tend 
to have a delayed and persistent effect on economic activ-
ity, have played a greater role in the cycles associated with 
the slower recoveries. Another reason is that since about 
1985, balance sheets have deteriorated more in response to 
adverse macroeconomic shocks than they used to, and as a 
result they have ampliﬁ  ed and propagated the direct contrac-
tionary effects of the shocks.
Because the VAR model that we have used is a simpli-
ﬁ  ed representation of the economy, it will be important to 
conﬁ  rm our results using more sophisticated models. Also, 
we have documented the differing impacts of household 
balance sheets in different business cycles, but we haven’t 
examined the reasons behind those differing impacts. One 
possibility could be, for instance, that changes in the types 
of assets and liabilities that households have on their balance 
sheets—and their greater sensitivities to asset price shocks—
might have something to do with both the greater role 
played by balance sheet shocks and the different response of 
leverage to macroeconomic shocks in the later cycles. 
When our results are used to interpret recent evidence on 
household ﬁ  nances, they suggest conditions may be im-
proving. While households have been saving at a high rate 
to repair their balance sheets for some time, there have been 
signs that this deleveraging process has attenuated: House-
hold leverage has come down from its peak and the saving 
rate has leveled out. These signs may point to a stronger 
pickup of consumption and a more robust recovery.
Footnotes
1. More precisely, we decompose the logarithm of real GDP 
into the sum of its trend and the log-GDP gap. In turn, we 
compute the log-GDP trend as the piecewise linear trend that 
interpolates the NBER peaks of log-GDP. For the 1960:Q2 
cycle, however, the resulting trend growth would be too high 
and would distort the results, so we use the average postwar 
growth rate instead. For the last cycle (2007:Q4), we extend 
the trend line from the previous 2001:Q1 cycle.
2. The duration of the recovery is the weighted average of the
number of quarters that it took for GDP to return to its 
trend. To construct the average, each quarter is weighted by 
the percentage of the total GDP gap that was closed in that 
quarter. For instance, if ¹/³ of the GDP gap were closed in the 
ﬁ  rst quarter of the recovery, and ²/³ in the second quarter, the 
duration would be (¹/³ × 1) + (²/³  × 2) = 5/³ = 1.66 quarters.
3. The model is a four-lag VAR of the following variables: the 
log of real GDP, the unemployment rate, the log of the GDP 
price deﬂ  ator, the three-month T-bill rate, the log of the WTI 
oil price, and the log of household leverage for the period 
1952:Q1–2010:Q2. Shocks are identiﬁ  ed using a Cholesky 
decomposition with the variables ordered as listed above.
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